Precarious Ascent: Trace and Terrain in René Daumal's Mount Analogue by McAuliffe, Sam
McAuliffe, Sam. 2019. Precarious Ascent: Trace and Terrain in Rene´ Daumal’s Mount Analogue.
Modern Language Notes, 134(4), pp. 783-805. ISSN 0026-7910 [Article]
http://research.gold.ac.uk/27604/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For
more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk
 1 
Precarious Ascent: Trace and Terrain in René Daumal’s Mount Analogue 
Sam McAuliffe 
 
MLN, Volume 134, Number 4, September 2019 (French Issue), pp. 783-805 
https://doi.org/10.1353/mln.2019.0086 
Abstract: 
Mount Analogue (1944) is René Daumal’s esoteric contribution to the mountain novel genre and 
the wider cultural phenomenon of “mountain reverence.” It records the fate of an expedition that 
has set out to scale the summits of a singular edifice, incomparably high, situated at the 
crossroads of the real and the imaginary. The topography of this uncharted terrain is paradoxical 
in the extreme, it subjects whoever tries to climb it to a series of unnerving, haphazard 
encounters, each of which complicate our classical models of space, action and orientation. For 
Daumal these paradoxes require nothing less than a new branch of knowledge, to which he gives 
the name alpinism (the novel is just as much a treatise on this art as a narrative of events). The 
article reconstructs the guiding principles of this method, their intersection with a series of 
related theoretical models, from Kant’s sublime to Derrida’s trace, as well as the specific 
aesthetic contexts across which Daumal’s euphoric engagement with the mountain is affirmed. 
 
Mountain Reverence 
“The poetic valorization of the mountain,” “the discovery of the mountain as a source of 
exaltation,” must be considered, writes Julien Gracq, “a revolution of capital importance in 
man’s geographic Weltanschauung” (104-05). Having played a formative role in “the 
construction of what we call European Romanticism,” over the course of the nineteenth century 
this discovery leaves transformed the set of attachments, projections and investments that make 
up the “landscapist sensibility.” The mountain is even the emblem, if we follow Gracq one step 
further here, of a new form of aesthetic community and a new means of communicability. The 
sensibility to which it is tied—“the first organically European collective creation”—emerges 
under fundamentally altered conditions of production, transmission and reception. Having 
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developed concomitantly across several otherwise unconnected territories through the 
“remarkable phenomenon of a spontaneously unified echo chamber” (106), the Romantic 
community that finds itself in this experience is neither rooted in nor bound by the strictures of a 
geography conceived in nationalist terms. If this sensibility thereby disrupts the longstanding 
bond between poetics and nation that sees the former as nothing but a function of the latter, then 
the mountain is an expression of this new lingua franca, the first symbol forged under these new 
conditions. 
In any case, on either side of its “discovery” this aspect of the landscape is attributed a 
very different sense. No longer disparaged as an anomalous presence within Nature’s design, an 
aberrant element at odds with the frames of reference underwriting Nature as something ordered; 
no longer seen as a terrain devoid of all charm, its asperity making it inhospitable, its verticality 
leaving it untraversable, resistant to all forms of cultivation and thus best left to itself at the 
landscape’s outer reaches, if it isn’t simply expunged altogether; no longer, finally, the scene of 
an anxiety that cannot be assuaged, the terrain upon which harmony with or mastery of Nature 
falters, instead the mountain becomes a primary setting for the “new ways of feeling” that 
increasingly make themselves known to the subject of experience in this period, whether these 
are experienced directly or vicariously.1 The repercussions of the mountain’s discovery are not 
restricted to the aesthetic sphere alone. They extend well beyond it in more than one direction. 
To take one example, Alain Corbin has shown the extent to which mountain reverence informed 
the period’s revised idea of the expedition: “A revolution in travel occurred during the first half 
of the nineteenth century. A new experience would occupy a prominent place in people’s dreams 
[. . .] Travelers set out to acquire a new experience of space and of other people outside the 
normal context. They thirsted for grandiose scenery and wild landscapes, camped out on 
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mountains and contemplated the sunny peaks above calm valleys below” (508). In the context of 
this newly discovered terrain and the attributes for which it is now prized—a wilderness that 
breaks with the quotidian; a promise of sanctuary, of elevation, of panorama; above all, an 
intimation of the infinite—the expedition becomes exploratory, and here the mountain is not 
simply an excursion’s end-point, but an opening, the site of an encounter that holds out the 
possibility for augmentation. “The chief aims of travel,” Corbin concludes, “became self-
affirmation and self-enrichment” (508). Not only does the mountain’s discovery redetermine the 
material and formal arrangement of the landscape as a whole, as well as the subject’s position 
within the schema of this environment, it has its part to play in recasting the configuration of 
faculties within the subject itself. 
*** 
René Daumal’s Mount Analogue, unfinished on account of his death in 1944, is situated 
some time after the high point of this phenomenon. The mountain’s valorization having long 
since become a commonplace, shopworn and frayed through overuse, its “capital importance” 
less and less apparent, by then it can no longer be treated as a privileged point of reference for 
the cultivation of aesthetic experience. “. . . We have seen certain regions of the earth come to be 
admired in our own time,” writes Paul Valéry in the same period. “Very soon people rush in, 
painters abound, and the place is desecrated by the innkeeper, the travel agent, and the 
photographer” (141). The mountain must no doubt be considered such a setting. Either it 
succumbs to the picturesque—an odious word for an odious sentiment, Daumal writes elsewhere 
(Powers of the Word 24) —or else it risks being reduced to nothing more than a leisure 
attraction, a site of mass recreation, and this to the extent that even its untamable element can 
apparently be placed in the service of modern rationalization, as a curative to the demands made 
 4 
on a social order encompassed by this process. This attitude is prevalent in exemplary fashion in 
the documentation of the 1937 Paris assembly of the Congrès internationaux d'architecture 
moderne (CIAM). Devoted to the problem of “Dwelling and Recreation,” to envisaging how 
these spheres of experience would appear under an optimal arrangement of social space, one of 
the congress reports notes that, for the pressure exerted by the modern city on its inhabitants to 
be made in any way tolerable, it requires periodic alleviation, in the form of access to clearly 
designated scenic spaces devoted to the provision of “full leisure.” These should be located well 
beyond the city’s confines and from them all traces of quotidian life should be eliminated. But 
what is striking here is the way in which such a setting is understood to facilitate recovery. It 
does so not by offering respite from the pressure in question, but by meeting it with an equal, if 
not even greater force. These leisure zones should impart “a violent reaction which can only be 
achieved by direct contact with nature of the harshest kind” (qtd. in Barsac 314-15). Of course 
the mountain’s attributes make it precisely such a site.2 But all this confirms that the mountain is 
fated to see its potency incrementally diminish. If even the unwieldy, indomitable aspect of 
nature can be assigned a definite function, integrated into a network of rationalization that it 
therefore lies only ostensibly outside of, if it is reduced to nothing more than a subsidiary of the 
functionalist city, isn’t the mountain ultimately fated to become a space like any other? 
This, a part of the wider cultural context within which Mount Analogue is written, is 
sketched in outline here to show the degree to which Daumal’s conception of the mountain will 
diverge from it. Not only does his novel retain an echo of the prior Romantic sensibility, it 
manages to propel the latter’s terms, against the general tendency of its own time, to an even 
greater intensity, reverence for the mountain carried to the point that it becomes feverous. In no 
way does this betray a pursuit of spent glory, a blind persistence with a now redundant subject. 
 5 
Instead, with disarming acuity, the experience of the mountain is stripped of anything other than 
the aporia that, now as before, conditions it.3 
*** 
Figment 
Daumal’s narrator recounts his part in an expedition that has set out to scale the summits 
of an apparently impassable edifice. It is impassable not only because of its height, which 
exceeds all common measure, nor because its whereabouts are, for properly speculative reasons, 
uncertain (caught in a “curvature of space” and thus deflecting the light that would ordinarily 
disclose it, it remains imperceptible to ordinary perception and can only be approached under 
very specific conditions [Mount Analogue 48-50]); it is impassable, first and foremost, because 
its actual existence remains to be established beyond all doubt. As the narrator first makes clear, 
never had it occurred to him to conceive of Mount Analogue as anything other than a fiction. He 
had always presumed that its existence was symbolic rather than real. Yet no sooner has this 
premise been established, it is straight away confounded by the conceit with which the novel 
begins and which continues to mark each of its subsequent episodes. The narrator has received 
an unexpected response to a half-forgotten article he has authored, a survey of the “symbolic 
significance” of the mountain as it appears across various ancient mythologies. The article, so we 
are told, should have been recognizable to whoever has read it as a “literary fantasy” (22); it 
gives every indication that its principal referent—the mountain as symbol of the absolute—is a 
work of the imagination, and thus something absent from reality in principle.4 To take the text 
literally would be “absurd,” and no one, so we are told, could have done so having acted in good 
faith. But this is precisely what the curious letter received by the narrator appears to do. 
Disregarding the narrator’s authorial intentions, as well as the code of genre conventions in 
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which the text has circulated, the letter’s sender, a Professor Sogol, issues an invitation to set out 
in pursuit of Mount Analogue, to treat this figment as though it were something real, to render it 
a reality by treating it as such. The subsequent sequence of events that unfurls across the novel—
in which the mountain appears in a multitude of forms: as an object of scientific enquiry, a site of 
mystic experience, an entry in a traveller’s logbook, the backdrop for a series of apologues, even 
a parlor game puzzle—therefore rests on this initial displacement, a productive confusion 
between fantasy and reality that sees the path of the narrative develop across registers ordinarily 
held apart from one another, so that their opposition is from the first suspended. Because of this 
conceit, whatever then occurs, no matter how fantastic, appears to bear the stamp of actuality. 
And this means that of the many genres Daumal’s novel has a share in—from the conte 
philosophique to the adventure story, up to and including the marvel tale: these are Roger 
Shattuck’s suggestions in his introduction to the novel (15)—prominent among them would be 
that form of fiction called utopian. As Ernst Bloch insists, while whatever a utopian text refers to 
is necessarily inexistent, present there because absent from reality, and this to the extent that, 
from reality’s perspective, it appears to be impossible, nevertheless this entity “is not something 
like nonsense or absolute fancy; rather it is not yet in the sense of a possibility; that it could be 
there if we could only do something for it. Not only if we travel there, but in that we travel there 
the island utopia arises out of the sea of the possible—utopia, but with new contents” (3). Mount 
Analogue is precisely such a possible world for the expedition that goes in search of it. Only 
insofar as it is approached does it come into view, because only by being approached is it drawn 
out of the state of preclusion in which it otherwise languishes. And all this is expressed 
emblematically by the name of the “sound little ship” that carries the narrator and his fellow 




The passage mapped out by this expedition into uncharted terrain and the line of ascent it 
envisages draws upon an eclectic body of techniques, practices, stratagems and hypotheses. 
Pieced together these constitute nothing less than a new art, to which Daumal gives the name 
alpinism, and this “novel of symbolically authentic Non-Euclidean adventures in Mountain 
Climbing” (to recall the work’s eccentric subtitle), is as much a formal treatise on this art as it is 
a narrative of events. The author’s working notes, published alongside the novel proper and 
constituting a far-sighted document in their own right, make available in schematic form the 
guiding principles of this art, and on their basis it is possible to reconstruct what are for Daumal 
the fundamental topographic features of Mount Analogue’s terrain. Its point of departure is to 
treat the mountain not as an object of contemplation but a field of action:  
 
Definitions. —Alpinism is the art of climbing mountains in such a way as to face the 
greatest risks with the greatest prudence. Art is here taken to mean knowledge realized in 
action. (103) 
 
Precariousness is the prevailing feature of the mountain’s environment. At each moment, with 
each step, the subject of action is faced with a landform so hazardous, the vagaries of which are 
so extreme, it cannot rely on any existing standard of experience to guide its efforts. No rule can 
be established that would hold for every eventuality encountered, because the accident that 
essentially defines this terrain does not have a stable, invariant form (any suggestion of 
consistency is simply a mirage, produced by a generalized disorder). The threat that this accident 
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constitutes cannot be nullified once and for all, only postponed, and this places any prospective 
plan of action in a peculiar position. However coherent its itinerary is in and of itself, the 
mountain’s reality confounds its implementation, which means the subject only advances 
through an act that is irreducible to what has been planned for, that is contingent, even 
gratuitous; for the alpinist, purposive action is dictated by chance circumstance. 
Conversely, to take up a position in knowledge and cling to it irrespective of the traps 
that lay littered across this particular field of action amounts to an idealism that would prove, in 
reality, fatal. This stance is parodied by Daumal in the form of a prospective member of the 
expedition, a “devotee of Hegel,” a proponent of “a school of mountain climbing roughly 
described as ‘the German school.’” The narrator continues:  
 
Its method could be described this way: you attack the steepest slope of a mountain along 
the least promising approach, the one which is most crumbling and exposed to rock-
slides, and you climb straight toward the summit without allowing yourself to look for 
any convenient detours to right or to left. Usually you succeed in killing yourself, but 
sooner or later some national team reaches the summit alive. (44)  
 
Needless to say, this character will make his excuses and withdraw from the expedition before it 
even begins. The method is preserved intact, but at the cost of its “realization in action.” As 
Daumal says elsewhere, “Any metaphysics that is sufficient unto itself suggests the vain pleasure 
of a man who whiles away the hours reading travel guides and timetables, tracing out routes on a 
map, and thinks that he is actually travelling” (Always Wrong 11). 
As a form of praxis that, above and beyond its immediate circumstance, must all the 
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while proceed with an ultimate end in mind—the summit—alpinism presides over a course of 
action. It is tasked with securing the continuity of this course, its uninterrupted movement 
onward and upward, facilitating the transition from one point of station to the next, all the more 
difficult in that the territory’s haphazardness makes prior understanding of what these points 
consist in impossible. Without this effort there is nothing to ensure that an action would meet up 
with itself on the other side of the ever-present impasse which risks stopping it dead in its tracks.  
 
If you slip or have a minor fall, don’t allow yourself an instant’s pause. Find your pace 
again as soon as you get up [. . .] Never halt on a shifting slope. Even if you think you 
have a firm foothold, as you take time to catch your breath and have a look at the sky, the 
ground will settle little by little under your weight, the gravel will begin to slip 
imperceptibly, and suddenly it will drop away under you and launch you like a ship. The 
mountain is always waiting for the chance to give you a spill. (104-05) 
 
All this implies the need for an extreme rapidity on the part of the acting subject: “man acts the 
way lightning strikes” (Powers of the Word 4). The knowledge informing this art, if it is to 
maintain the action in motion, must be deployed the moment it is called upon, with as little delay 
as possible, reacting immediately to the ruleless unpredictability of the environment, 
spontaneous to the point that action and reaction are difficult to dissociate. The “prudence” this 
calls for therefore implies a process of continual invention and re-invention, a ceaseless 
expenditure with every step taken, which makes of every step the first.5 
In this sense, the line of ascent drawn up here does not hold together as one: for the 
course of action it guides to remain unbroken, it must constantly contort, digress and bifurcate, 
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and this complicates the rudimentary distinctions between straight path and detour, forwards and 
backwards, upwards and downwards, motion and repose—whatever would otherwise inform a 
logic of orientation. Above all, the subject of action can presume nothing whatsoever about the 
field that is being traversed. A little further along in these working notes Daumal stages a few 
lines of stop-start dialogue with himself that open with a question: “‘What do you mean by 
analogical mountain climbing?’” But whatever is offered by way of response to this query is not 
allowed to stand without being questioned in turn, until the exchange culminates in a final 
question, that as the dialogue’s last word, is left unanswered: “What is a mountain?” (103) This 
should be taken in all seriousness. For the alpinist, the fundamental object under examination 
remains to be determined, and this can only be decided upon in the course of scaling it. In this 
sense, alpinism develops as the imaginary solution to the question “what is a mountain?”6 
*** 
Boundlessness 
It is never brought into the foreground, at least not explicitly, but there is a Kantian 
context informing the narrator’s initial presentation of Mount Analogue. “What defines the scale 
of the ultimate symbolic mountain—the one I propose to call Mount Analogue—is its 
inaccessibility to ordinary human approaches” (24). Does this definition not draw upon the 
rhetoric of the sublime, more precisely, the sublime in its “mathematical” form? The edifice in 
question is of an order of magnitude that renders it “absolutely large,” “large beyond all 
comparison,” a “maximum” (Kant 103; 107). It shows itself to be fundamentally excessive with 
respect to the forms and proportions by which it would ordinarily be recognized, and it surpasses 
these limits in a way that refuses to yield to any measure. Such incommensurability is what 
makes of the sublime entity a singularity without counterpart: as Kant says, “we do not permit a 
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standard adequate to it to be sought outside it, but only within it. It is a magnitude that is equal 
only to itself.” And it is this that allows him to infer that the mathematical sublime, precisely on 
account of this incomparability, is that “in comparison with which everything else is small” 
(105). The narrator conceives of Mount Analogue in precisely these terms. It is the mountain that 
makes every other appear insignificant. It draws together these others in a series to which it itself 
doesn’t belong and in relation to which it itself can’t be placed. “Now, Sinai, Nebo and Olympus 
have long since become what mountaineers call ‘cow pastures’; and even the highest peaks of 
the Himalayas are no longer considered inaccessible today. All these summits have therefore lost 
their analogical importance” (24). 
Since this magnitude cannot be made amenable with any measure other than its own, it 
does not pass through the recognized channels of representation. It can only appear there, Kant 
says, as a disruption, as something “contrapurposive for our power of judgment, incommensurate 
with our power of exhibition, and as it were violent to our imagination” (99). Hence the 
“unboundedness” that remains its fundamental feature. Daumal’s alpinist is well aware of the 
disturbance to which the mountain’s appearance is tied, whether it is broached as an object of 
vision (that which is seen) or vision’s instrument (that by which one sees): “Victor Hugo, coming 
down from the Rigi, which even in his day was not considered very high, remarked that the view 
of the world from high peaks does such violence to our visual habits that the natural takes on the 
appearance of the supernatural” (68). 
Once this disruptive aspect of the narrative’s principal referent is acknowledged it 
perhaps accounts for an idiosyncratic formal feature of Daumal’s work. This concerns the fate 
met by description in the novel. If it is true, as Michel Leiris maintains, that “a description, of 
whatever kind it may be, always consists of discovering something human in its object, of 
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bringing down to our human height the inordinately large size that objects acquire from the fact 
that they are separate from us” (15), if every object is thus in a certain sense mountainous until 
re-calibrated by the work of description into a determinable form, then Mount Analogue may 
well be indescribable in the strict sense, the entity before which the efforts of description falter.7 
The mountain constitutes a limit to this particular exercise of the “power of exhibition.” It resists 
being brought back down to “human height,” to “ordinary human approach.” (The narrator is 
insistent on this point: the presentation of a magnitude, so he argues, cannot be re-scaled in the 
way that the proportions of a building can be grasped through a scale model, for example—this 
would nullify its effect [23-24].) At stake here is an object that confounds the discursive register 
that is arguably the mainstay of literature as a form, or is at least subtracted from this form only 
with great difficulty. And it is certainly the case that over and above the descriptive detailing 
undertaken throughout the novel, as a rule Mount Analogue’s topography is most starkly 
delineated when presented schematically. The tendency is discernible in the diagrammatic 
sketches of the mountain’s dimensions and location that supplement the text at a certain point in 
the narrative. It is also apparent in an early draft of the opening chapter, in which Daumal has his 
narrator make plain the necessity for this mode of presentation: “What I have to tell is so 
extraordinary that I must take certain precautions. To teach anatomy, one uses conventional 
diagrams—rather than photographs—which differ in every respect from the object to be studied, 
except that certain relations—specifically, those that form the thing to be known—are preserved. 
I have done the same here.”8 What precipitates this deliberate turn away from description and its 
conventions, the suspension of a naturalist register in favor of schematic abstraction, so that the 
characteristic features of the region’s terrain are reconstructed with as little concession as 
possible to the pictorial, together forming less an illustration of the landscape’s outer appearance 
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than an index of relations between lineaments from which a set of topographical postulates can 
be directly deduced, what precipitates this if not that the mountain in question is 
“incommensurate with our power of exhibition”? The varied use of schema across the novel 
shows an attempt to develop a representational framework for an entity the characteristics of 
which cannot be grasped by description alone.9 
*** 
Labyrinth 
And yet at a certain point the affinity with Kant breaks off. Something of Daumal’s 
alpinism remains irreducible to the principles of Kantian aesthetics. Recall that the feeling of the 
sublime can take hold within the subject only inasmuch as the scene responsible for eliciting this 
feeling is surveyed from the sanctuary of a “safe place” (Kant 120). Whilst the subject is 
confronted by nature in “its wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation,” exposed by this 
encounter to an “agitation,” and even, as already mentioned, a certain “violence,” ultimately the 
sublime experience must stop short of leaving the subject in real danger (99-100). Were it to do 
so, it would pass over into fear, pure and simple, and the ground of the experience would simply 
give way (120). However minimal, a distance or interval from the sublime event is the condition 
of being affected by it, and this distance is not merely formal: it pertains to the subject’s material 
existence, its living support, or, in Kant’s words, its “vital force.” It requires a sanctuary and this 
sanctuary must remain inviolate. Precisely this, however, is what Daumal’s alpinist cannot be 
sure of. The terrain of Mount Analogue is structured so that the requisite interval is never 
definitively secured. It can collapse at any moment, and if it continues to hold together, it only 
ever does so contingently.  
This is confirmed by the definitive definition of the mountain’s topography, given in the 
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novel’s opening stages. 
 
For a mountain to play the role of Mount Analogue, I concluded, its summit must be 
inaccessible but its base accessible to human beings as nature has made them. It must be 
unique and it must exist geographically. The door to the invisible must be visible. (24) 
 
 
Wherever it is viewed from, the topography delineated here is constitutively paradoxical.  No 
matter what efforts are expended to ascend it, the summit appears to guard itself in its 
inaccessibility. It could even be said to recede to the degree that it is approached (and the fact of 
Daumal’s death, having left the novel broken off in mid-sentence, does indeed ensure that the 
summit is left intact). The paradox does not end there. The summit is inaccessible but this 
doesn’t mean it isn’t available in its own way. Far from this casting it into seclusion, it is seen at 
all times and from all perspectives—that is to say, it is never not seen: “The door to the invisible 
must be visible”—and this arrangement is responsible for a series of distortionary effects, so 
many symptoms of mountain fever. For example, the force of the summit’s patency, its excessive 
presence, can distract, can induce blindness to the dangers lying all around ("Keep your eye fixed 
on the top, but don't forget to look right in front of you”); equally its patency can beguile, giving 
the illusory impression that the peak is right here, within arm’s reach, when nothing could be 
further from the truth (“Don't think you're there just because you see the summit" [105]).  
And yet all this is complicated in turn by the unassuming yet formidable qualification 
made by the narrator here, heightening the paradox that encompasses this terrain still further. Not 
all of Mount Analogue is unapproachable. On the contrary, its lower regions lie open, freely 
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accessible. It therefore follows that the mountain’s setting, when considered as a totality, 
encompasses the distinction between the accessible and the inaccessible, drawing them into a 
single continuum. If they remain essentially irreducible, there is no clear line of demarcation to 
separate them. And this means that from the first step onward the ground on which the alpinist 
stands is contiguous with the unbounded, the formless, always already exposed to the absence of 
ground. Whoever attempts to navigate the terrain cannot be sure beyond all doubt where one 
region ends and the next begins, nor which side of this threshold they stand on. This makes of the 
mountain a labyrinth, and it means the course of action that alpinism is tasked with securing is 
drawn into a space in which its future fate becomes opaque, a space so perplexing it appears to 
withdraw the very possibility of determining whether or not one has entered its field. Here is a 
setting with no safe place.10 
*** 
Trace 
Nothing easier to enter, nothing harder to exit; where there is a labyrinth, there is the need 
for a thread. Without a means of marking a trail, of sustaining contact with where it has set out 
from, an expedition risks forfeiting in advance a relation to the wider world beyond Mount 
Analogue, and above all the possibility of returning to this world from on high. After all, the 
mountaintop is only ever a midway point for the expedition that scales it. “You cannot stay on 
the summit for ever; you have to come down again . . .” (103). The imaginary solution to the 
mountain must therefore include a program for its descent, and not the ascent alone. It must do 
so in spite of the fact that the summit is unattainable, which therefore leaves this program in a 
peculiar state of superfluity, given its realization is so unlikely. Whoever approaches the peak 
has to presume, against all odds, that the impossible will happen, and that having happened, the 
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prospect of making one’s way back down from on high is held open, that the ascent does not 
come at the cost of the descent.  
For this reason alpinism rests in no small part on a theory of the trace. Admittedly this 
idea remains relatively undeveloped in the narrative as it stands, but from Véra Daumal’s 
overview of the chapters left unwritten at the time of the author’s death (101), it is clear that it 
would have been a key aspect of the final stages of the expedition. In any case, an apologue 
found amongst Daumal’s working notes allows the premises of this theory to be reconstructed. 
 
When you strike off on your own, leave some trace of your passage which will guide you 
coming back: one stone set on another, some grass weighed by a stick. But if you come to 
an impasse or a dangerous spot, remember that the trail you have left could lead people 
coming after you into trouble. So go back along your trail and obliterate any traces you 
have left. This applies to anyone who wishes to leave some mark of his passage in the 
world. Even without wanting to, you always leave a few traces. Be ready to answer to 
your fellow men for the trail you leave behind you. (105-06) 
 
An expedition’s progress through uncharted territory is dependent upon the trace for its success. 
The trace acts as a marker, an anchor, a potential coordinate for a course of action. It provides a 
means of orientation, of making legible one’s passage through the terrain, to oneself or another, 
as and when needed. Above all it makes it possible to re-trace one’s own steps, to recover a 
previous point of station along the course of action unfolding. Passage through the terrain 
without this facility would be directionless, exposed without defense to the deviousness of the 
labyrinth. And from this it follows that a trace is always situated at a juncture of some sort. It 
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marks the spot where a decision has imposed itself on the alpinist, a choice between possible 
pathways, each branch of which excludes the other. Whichever trail is opted for, then, the trace’s 
inscription remains supplemented by those not taken, which are therefore retained in a potential 
state, so that they may be taken up at a future point, if and when this proves necessary. 
But as Daumal also makes perfectly clear, a trace is neither indelible nor infallible. 
Whilst its inscription is a necessity here—to be clear, it cannot not be traced: “Even without 
wanting to, you always leave a few traces” —nevertheless, as Jacques Derrida recalls time and 
again, “There is no trace itself, no proper trace” (66). From the first moment it is traced, the 
integrity of its sens, its meaning and direction, is always already threatened. On the one hand, the 
trace cannot cease to signify, it cannot help but emit a signal of some kind. One cannot pass by 
“one stone set upon another” and not find oneself implicated in some way: “In the mountains a 
man becomes very attentive to any sign indicating the presence of one of his fellow men” (Mount 
Analogue 94). And yet on the other hand what it is that a particular trace signifies is equivocal in 
the extreme, even for the one who has traced it. Its fundamental sense is never given once and for 
all. It can change, unexpectedly and inadvertently, without any modification whatsoever of its 
outward appearance, leaving it to signify something else entirely than what was initially 
intended. “Always differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself” 
(Derrida 23). In this sense the system of traces on which the expedition is dependent for its 
bearings cannot be relied upon, even provisionally. A trace misleads, not accidentally but 
essentially. And it does this by rendering the true path and the wayward one indistinguishable. A 
sign that was meant to mark safe passage can always end up exposing its recipient to the precise 
opposite: dead end, digression, or worse. The very thing that was meant to secure the course of 
action, to provide it with a framework, is what ends up leading it astray. 
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If the expedition is to make its way forward, then—and it has no other means of 
proceeding—it must tend to the traces it leaves in its wake, returning to a trace that has proven 
itself errant with a view to correcting it. “So go back along your trail and obliterate any traces 
you have left.” The fate of the alpinist is caught up in this pataphysical discovery: a mountain is 
scaled in two opposing directions at once. The movement charted across its terrain is bifurcated, 
a step forward must be supplemented by a step back. In any event, what this confirms is that a 
trace is, in principle, revocable. This is even its fundamental feature: there is no ineffaceable 
trace, “erasure belongs to its structure” (Derrida 24). And if this is the case, to turn back towards 
the site of inscription implies an effort that is interminable. Even an ostensibly straight line 
between two points is potentially exposed to a form of circuitousness without conceivable end. 
How could one re-trace one’s steps, how could one return to a trace, intending to erase it, without 
potentially generating further traces in turn? If one leaves traces “even without wanting to,” 
would this not also apply, and perhaps nowhere more so, to the trace’s erasure? And how could it 
be guaranteed that the erasure of the trace was not itself misguided, or at least premature; that, 
progressing a little further along the trail, the effacement would not show itself to be equally ill 
founded? The erasure of a trace isn’t any less fallible than the tracing of a trace. Erasure is not 
the trace’s truth, but simply confirmation that the trace is never proper, traced or erased. Which 
means there is nothing to ensure that the trace, once erased, will not have to be corrected in turn, 
by being re-traced, and so on, mise en abîme. Daumal touches on this in disarming terms in an 
earlier text: “Space is the universal tomb, not the image of my freedom. When the horizon ceases 
to be the receding image of freedom, when it is no more than a bar placed before the eyes and 
man feels himself guided by the hands of space, then he will begin to know what it means to be 
free” (Powers of the Word 4). This is the maddening logic to which alpinism, as a theory of the 
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trace, is exposed at each turn. And it is why aporia, the impossibility of passage (a-póros), 
impinges upon all of its actions. 
Is it possible, then, to envisage a way of out of this impasse, a means of resolving this 
otherwise interminable play of traces? Yes and no.11 
*** 
Crystal 
This question leads us, finally, to the apogee of Mount Analogue’s terrain, that which 
every effort is ultimately aimed at, the summit itself. In Daumal’s working notes, as well as in 
the novel itself, there is no doubt a line of thought that considers the summit to be the mountain’s 
solution. It persists there as something like a temptation, mystical or idealist in turn, and this is 
evident from the first presentation of the mountain onwards. “[I]n  the mythic tradition,” explains 
the narrator, 
 
the Mountain is the bond between Earth and Sky. Its solitary summit reaches the sphere 
of eternity, and its base spreads out in manifold foothills into the world of mortals. It is 
the way by which man can raise himself to the divine, and by which the divine reveals 
itself to man. (22-23) 
 
 
No doubt it is here that Daumal’s far-reaching engagement with spiritualist doctrine is most 
acutely felt.12 But it is also here, at the highest height, that the aporia to which alpinism is subject 
acquires its fullest force, because it returns at the heart of the turn taken to remedy it, breaking 
apart the solution to the mountain’s puzzle from the inside, as it were. In what sense does the 
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summit constitute a solution here? Inasmuch as to accede to its ground is synonymous for 
Daumal with the accession of absolute knowledge. (Of course this aim is already anticipated in 
the figure of Sogol, who sits at the head of the expedition and whose name expresses in inverse 
form its guiding principle.)  
From the viewpoint of the summit, Mount Analogue would finally be given up in its 
entirety to the subject of experience. It would become representable as a totality. “What is above 
knows what is below,” writes Daumal in a fragment guided by this premise,  
 
but what is below does not know what is above. In climbing, always take note of 
difficulties along the way; for as you go up, you can observe them. Coming down, you 
will no longer see them, but you will know they are there if you have observed them well. 
One climbs, one sees. One descends, one sees no longer but one has seen. There is an art 




The summit’s vista offers an unfettered survey of the terrain that has been navigated in order to 
arrive there (as if absolute knowledge consisted of nothing more than the recuperation of the 
movement undertaken towards it). Above it, nothing further, below it, nothing withheld from it, 
the gaze at this altitude is in principle all seeing, panoramic (“ . . . the exaltation on heights that 
reveal the kingdoms of the earth . . . ” writes Valéry in the essay already mentioned [142]). And 
not only does this point of view give unconditional access to whatever is surveyed, the 
knowledge this grants forms a repository one can draw on as one makes one’s way back down 
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towards the point of departure. Of course, on account of its inaccessibility, one can only speak 
hypothetically about this perspective, but it is as if its aspect held out the promise of a 
momentary exit from the labyrinth, as if the chaotic prevarication of the trace was stabilized, 
finally making available safe passage across the terrain. It would even be the point at which the 
equivocation between fantasy and reality that structures each of the narrative’s episodes would 
finally be resolved, in reality’s favor, if we take one of the narrator’s fellow alpinists at his word: 
“‘At high altitudes [. . .] there's no place for the fantastic, because reality itself is more marvelous 
than anything man could imagine. Could anyone dream up a gnome or a giant or a hydra or a 
catoblepas to rival the terrifying power and mystery of a glacier, the tiniest little glacier?’” (67) 
But at the same time the same summit bears another set of properties, the effects of which 
appear irreducible to those just mentioned, and this works to confound the alpinist schema at the 
moment of its expected realization. With the culminating step, the point at which this body of 
knowledge is meant to finally coincide with its object, something causes this step to falter. 
Only once does Daumal’s narrator allow himself a clear intimation of what the summit’s 
prospect might actually look like. He does so, moreover, giving the impression that this 
inaccessible plateau has been conquered, that it is before him, around him, there and then as he is 
writing, as though the expedition had arrived or was on the cusp of arriving at its destination.  
 
On high, remote in the sky, above and beyond successive circles of increasingly lofty 
peaks buried under whiter and whiter snows, in a splendor the eye cannot look upon, 
invisible through excess of light, rises the uttermost pinnacle of Mount Analogue. (39) 
 
Each feature of the vista alighted upon here exposes the summit’s standpoint to a fundamental 
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complication. Acceding to its terrain apparently does nothing to lessen its inaccessibility. The 
absolute vision it is meant to consolidate, the bond between knowledge and vision it is meant to 
confirm, is instead left indistinguishable from its opposite. At this vertiginous height, the gaze is 
struck blind, hollowed out by a revelatory light that forces one to look away, to shield one’s eyes 
(gestures which do nothing to mitigate its excess). Something of the apocalyptic nature of this 
scene makes itself known in a song the narrator tells us is sung in the summit’s vicinity, and 
which is being sung—again, to reiterate the narrative conceit here—as he is recording his 
impressions. The verse makes clear that, even as the mountain burgeons upward and exceeds its 
terrestrial setting, its extension opening onto the beyond by piercing the canopy of sky that 
usually gives a landscape its sense of enclosure, the summit’s vista nevertheless retains certain 
clearly delineated features.  
 
There, on a summit more pointed than the finest needle, 
He who fills all space resides unto himself. 
On high in the most rarified air where all freezes into stone, 
The supreme and immutable crystal alone subsists. 
Up there, exposed to the full fire of the firmament  
 where all is consumed in flame, 
Subsists the perpetual incandescence. (39) 
 
 
Here, then, is Mount Analogue’s landscape laid bare in its most extreme form: an impermeable 
block of colorless matter, translucent to the point of transparency and thus seemingly radiated 
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from within, light passing through it as if it was not there. Its outer contours do not enclose it 
within the limits they ostensibly trace, and this leaves it indiscernible from its surrounding 
environment (a further sense in which it is unbounded). No longer lending itself to sensory 
representation, the landscape here is an abstraction and yet entirely real, a manifest invisibility: 
“The supreme and immutable crystal.”13 
But this means that once its threshold is crossed, the summit conspires against the already 
precarious logic informing the arrangement of the lower regions. It sweeps away the ground on 
which it has been approached, and nowhere more so does this show itself than in relation to the 
trace. Along the mountain’s uppermost span, the terrain is such that a trace can no longer be left 
there. The higher one ascends, the less patent a trace becomes, until even its provisional efficacy 
is suspended (this and all that rests on it: the possibility of navigation, of maintaining contact 
with the base, of plotting a movement through space, even of situating oneself in space). No 
doubt the summit considered as a traceless environment is a longstanding motif of mountain 
reverence.14 But with Daumal the trace’s annulment is carried a step further. Once the 
mountain’s terrain becomes crystalline and accedes to a state of pure pellucidity, there is no 
longer a recognizable surface or subjectile, no longer a tabula upon which a trace could be 
inscribed or, more perplexingly, in relation to which it could be erased. For this reason the 
summit cannot in any proper sense be traversed. It lacks even the most rudimentary 
characteristics of a ground, and it therefore confounds any conceivable schema of orientation: 
across it a trail cannot be laid, a signal cannot be dispatched, communication, with oneself or 
another, cannot come to pass. The crystalline landscape is an a-signifying space: it offers no 
means of re-tracing one’s steps, of making one’s way back down, of even maintaining the 
general directional sense that would allow one to say in which direction down is. If it is true that, 
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when viewed from the base, “The door to the invisible must be visible,” it is no less the case that 
once one passes through this point of entry onto its other side, it appears to close shut, without 
leaving any vestige of having ever been an opening.  
If, then, the possibility of the trace is thereby revoked, isn’t this the sign that the summit 
is less a means of exiting the labyrinth than the moment its puzzle is made absolute? At the 
highest height, the labyrinth appears all the more tortuous for taking the form of a blank, 
featureless expanse, without dimension, gradation or horizon, a labyrinth that does not even offer 
the possibility of passage. It is a space within which one cannot even be lost, if to be lost 
presumes a correct way of advancing, and because it cannot be marked in any way, one cannot 
hope to return from its heights. The moment that alpinism tentatively codifies a rule of sorts, the 
mountain discloses the part of itself that proves to be this rule’s exception, rendering the rule 
inoperative. With the summit alpinism as a body of knowledge therefore encounters a limit. The 
total disclosure of its object exposes it to a danger that no conceivable act of prudence could 
counter, that even suspends the capacity for action altogether. But in a certain sense to encounter 
this limit is already to find oneself on its other side, and this marks the precise moment at which 
mountain reverence gives way to mountain fever.  
*** 
Coda 
A final confirmation of the paradoxical circumstance in which the logic of the trace is 
caught here is shown in a further enigmatic episode that occurs some way along the journey’s 
course. Having finally located the “new world” in which Mount Analogue stands, the expedition 
finds that it is not without precursors. Across the mountain’s lower regions, a series of 
settlements have gradually developed, made up of those who at one time or another attempted to 
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scale this edifice, but were unable to progress any further.15 Marking the precise locale at which 
each previous attempt at ascension has faltered, these colonies stand as monuments to the 
summit’s inaccessibility. Several of the characteristically eccentric rituals and customs of these 
“mountain people” are recorded by Daumal’s narrator with an ethnographer’s diligence, but what 
stands out amongst them is the precious material prized by this small-scale civilization above all 
else. It is to the colonies of Mount Analogue what gold is to the wider world—its contingent 
properties are taken as a sign of intrinsic value—and it is the only form of currency, incidentally, 
that can secure the assistance of a guide for the journey to the summit. “Peradam” is the name 
given to this scarce and enigmatic stone. Scattered across the mountain’s landscape—although 
not entirely arbitrarily, its incidence is greater the higher one climbs—transparency is its 
distinguishing property, and this makes the search for these stones “difficult and even 
dangerous,” again increasingly so the higher up the terrain one progresses.  
 
It is a true crystal and—an extraordinary instance entirely unknown elsewhere on this 
planet—a curved crystal [. . .] This stone is so perfectly transparent and its index of 
refraction so close to that of air in spite of the crystal's great density, that the 
inexperienced eye barely perceives it. (78) 
  
Where gold shines, the peradam hides, in plain sight. And given what has been said about Mount 
Analogue’s topography, then beyond a certain height, wouldn’t the crystal’s indiscernibility 
approach an absolute state, culminating in an arrangement between trace and terrain that would 
be, strictly speaking, unpresentable, that would not even be able to appear as unpresentable? A 
transparent stone on a transparent expanse, one invisibility superimposed upon another: at Mount 
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Analogue’s outermost reaches both trace and terrain would be undetectable, not only in 
themselves, but in relation to one another. The minimal degree of difference between them 
would no longer hold, and without this difference neither could be made to manifest as what it is. 
If there is still a trace here, it cannot serve as a marker, “one stone set upon another,” because it 
no longer stands out against the ground upon which it is cast. On this terrain the trace is always 
already erased, and its erasure appears to leave no trace. But equally, in the absence of the trace, 
the terrain itself isn’t thrown into relief. Unmarked and unmarkable, it cannot be treated as a 
ground. With this truly obscure arrangement, Daumal places transparency in the service of 
something other than clarity. Coinciding without remainder, trace and terrain are together 
consigned to the void: that which bears no mark, that which has no ground.  
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1 Margorie Hope Nicolson refers to this reorientation of the century’s “dynamics of 
taste”—all the more remarkable for its abruptness—as a transition from “mountain gloom” to 
“mountain glory” (the terms of this opposition are taken from Ruskin) (17). For a vivid 
presentation of this gloom as a prevailing attitude, albeit in an earlier historical period—the 
mountain considered, at best, a “necessary evil”—see Christopher Hussey’s study The 
Picturesque. He quotes from John Evelyn’s travelogue, which has this to say about a journey 
across the Alps: it was “as if Nature had here swept up the rubbish of the earth . . . ” (85-86). 
2 This is noted explicitly by the report in question, and it is the impetus informing several 
CIAM associated projects of the time, foremost amongst which would be Charlotte Perriand’s 
remarkable plans for a series of high-altitude, prefabricated mountain refuges, aiming to 
formalize access to this new terrain. See the pages on this newly emergent Alpine “leisure 
architecture” in Barsac’s study of Perriand (316-38). 
3 Of course Daumal is not alone in turning to the mountain at the precise moment it has 
been reduced to a poncif. It is even possible to speak of a minor genre here, an eclectic collection 
of works within the modernist canon that show a fascination for the mountain in this state. For 
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example, a similar gesture is found in Robert Walser’s work—this will be our first digression 
into this genre—albeit undertaken in a different way: there the mountain is made disquieting 
once more, not by stripping back its familiarity, but accentuating it further still, drawing the 
mountain even further away from the wilderness that was the previous site of its reverence, and 
inscribing it all the more firmly within the familiar, so that its homeliness is pushed to the point 
that it tips over into the uncanny. Consider “the bewitching unnatural mountains” that appear in 
Kleist in Thun (1913). They appear in an exaggeratedly artificial, highly embellished guise, 
which sees them treated as part of a domestic setting: “Not a breath. Hardly a stir. The mountains 
are like the work of a clever scene-painter, or look like it; it is as if the whole region was an 
album, the mountains drawn on a blank page by an adroit dilettante for the lady who owns the 
album, as a souvenir, with a line of verse. The album has pale green covers. Which is 
appropriate” (20). 
4 As Roger Caillois says of the fantastic: it is what “cannot exist, properly speaking: it 
cannot be part of nature, of the attested universe” (349). 
5 We have here a model of action entirely in keeping with that drawn up by Le Grand 
Jeu, the experimental group in which the young Daumal played a prominent part. See, for 
example, the manifesto that stands at the head of the opening issue of the group’s eponymously 
titled journal. There the “Big Game” is introduced as, among other things, a “game of chance”: 
to play along is to allow one’s actions to be led by what occurs contingently, that which occurs 
“only once” and “at every moment of our lives”: “To search out the favorable attitude and the 
sign that drives the world forward is our aim [. . .] Attitude: we must place ourselves in a state of 
complete receptivity, which means to be pure, to have made a vacuum in ourselves” (Gilbert-
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Lecomte, 128). This makes Mount Analogue a metonym of Le Grand Jeu, a space navigated on 
the basis of this game’s principles. 
6 We use this formulation to insist on the little-noted pataphysical spirit in which the 
ascension of Mount Analogue is conceived and conducted. From his earliest writings, Daumal is 
entirely committed to the absurdist science inaugurated a generation earlier by Alfred Jarry. This 
is made apparent above all in the former’s ‘Pataphysics and the Revelation of Laughter’ (1929), 
in which he recalls Jarry’s watchword: “Pataphysics is the science of imaginary solutions, which 
symbolically attributes the properties of objects, described by their virtuality, to their 
lineaments.” To this Daumal adds: “Thus it is the opposite of physics, as knowledge of the 
specific and irreducible” (Powers of the Word 17). A paradoxical science of singular cases and 
exceptions, of what cannot be integrated under the generality of a law: this is precisely what the 
anomalous terrain of Mount Analogue calls for, and it means we must consider alpinism a branch 
of pataphysics. 
7 Compare this perspective with the almost limitless faith shown in description by 
Rousseau during his exile on Île Saint-Pierre, where this technique is presumed capable of 
redoubling the Book of Nature in all its inexhaustible detail: “I set about doing the Flora 
petrinsularis and describing all the plants of the island, without omitting a single one, in 
sufficient detail to occupy myself for the rest of my days. It is said that a German did a book 
about a lemon peel; I would have done one about each stalk of hay in the meadows, each moss in 
the woods, each lichen that carpets the rocks; in short, I did not want to leave a blade of grass or 
a plant particle which was not amply described” (65). 
8 Here we quote from a later edition of the novel than the City Lights original edition, as 
the latter does not include this draft material (Note from the French Edition 109). 
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9 On this point mention should be made of another great work of the period devoted to 
the problem of the mountain, Ludwig Hohl’s Bergfahrt (translated into English as Ascent). 
Begun in 1926 but not published until 1975, this novella puts into play an entirely different set of 
literary conventions to Mount Analogue, but one can nevertheless identify several points of 
intersection between the two works, chief among which is a recognition of the mountain’s 
indescribability. This is an ever present concern of Hohl’s narration, which continually probes 
the conditions of representing such an entity—“Cliffs are always more complicated than they 
appear from afar, and every description is necessarily a description from afar (otherwise the 
description would never end)” (75)—and this leaves its mark on the structure of the narrative in a 
number of ways. To take one example, at the culmination of a chapter in large part conducted in 
the “alpinist’s language,” given over to an almost scientific description of the seracs encountered 
across the mountain’s terrain, this mode of presentation all of a sudden gives way to a wild, 
unrestrained profusion of images, entirely out of keeping with the guidebook prose it has been 
juxtaposed with: the mountain’s glaciers come forth as “a tumult of figures or forms, like 
matterhorns or vampires’ teeth, an arrangement of lions or bears, caricatures of a baker or 
miller’s boy with his sack on his back, an alderman with a black hat, a mourning woman hung 
with cloths from head to toe, of crocodiles and dragons” (38). Isn’t the free play of the 
imagination here—the exaggerated specificity of these figures, the extreme contingency of the 
detail alighted upon—precisely the effect of the mountain as something “incommensurate with 
our power of exhibition”? 
10 Understood as such this topography is in complete accord with the model of space 
presented by Georges Bataille in the critical dictionary of the Encyclopedia Acephalica: 
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“Unfortunately space remains a lout, and it is difficult to enumerate what it engenders. It is as 
discontinuous as it is devious, to the utter despair of its philosopher-papa” (75). 
11 “For those who ask us about the Grand Jeu, we answer once and for all to any and 
every question: ‘Yes and no.’” (Powers of the Word 8) 
12 On this aspect of the author’s work, see Kathleen Ferrick Rosenblatt’s expansive study, 
René Daumal: The Life and Work of a Mystic Guide. She shows how this spiritualist context in 
all its variations, from Hindu philosophy to the doctrine of Gurdjieff, remains a formative point 
of reference within the world of Mount Analogue (xiv), and this leads her to read the novel, 
written as it is after the conversion to Gurdjieff’s teachings, as an allegory of this conversion, 
“the diary of an escape” undertaken with a view to leaving behind the prison of the ego, achieved 
through the techniques of self-renunciation that these spiritualist doctrines provide (197-211). 
She also makes clear the extent to which this influence definitively set Daumal at odds with the 
various avant-gardes with which he was initially associated; for example, she quotes a letter to 
Daumal from Julien Torma who, speaking as a representative of the pataphysical circle, chastises 
his colleague in the following terms: “[I]t’s obvious you believe in a kind of God. In spite of all 
your finesse, dear René, you’re on a pilgrim’s progress” (56). 
13 This configuration of lineaments bears more than passing resemblance to the 
centerpiece of Bruno Taut’s architectural fantasies—the “crystal mountain” (122)—and his 
Alpine Architecture of 1919 constitutes a case of mountain fever every bit as pronounced as 
Daumal’s. In this utopian work Taut presents a series of outlandish proposals for the 
development of Europe’s existing mountain ranges, which would modify the natural landscape 
along its highest vistas with a variety of constructions, ranging from small scale, decorative 
appendages to edifices eclipsing the size of the peak itself, compounding its magnitude still 
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further. Crucial here is that these structures, whether domiciles or follies, would be rendered 
exclusively in glass, initiating an unprecedented mimetic interplay between architecture and 
environment, the condition of which is the respective transparency of these materials. 
14 Consider Byron’s Manfred (1817), in which the Jungfrau peak is presented as follows: 
“And here on snows, where never human foot / Of common mortal trod, we nightly tread / And 
leave no traces (quoted in Nicolson 10). Or Max Frisch’s contribution to the mountain genre, 
written around the same time as Mount Analogue, where this tracelessness appears in the form of 
silence. Of the summit’s soundscape Frisch writes: “It is as if this silence over the world 
dissolves all thought; you can hear nothing but your heart beating, or now and then the wind 
whistling past your ears. And if a black chough should happen to glide round the rock and then 
disappear with a horse croak, there still remains the lonely silence, which envelops all life and 
swallows every cry as if it had never been, this nameless silence, which is perhaps God, perhaps 
nothingness” (22-23). 
 15 This, incidentally, is the moment in the narrative where the pursuit of the “supreme and 
immutable” is marked most forcefully by the novel’s wider historical context. The account of the 
expedition’s arrival on terra incognita is undoubtedly framed through the period’s colonialist 
imaginary. The mountain proves to be located, so the narrator tells us, in a region without 
“natives”: “All inhabitants have come from elsewhere, from the four corners of the world like 
ourselves.” And it is for this reason that, once ashore, the expedition unexpectedly finds itself in 
the company of “Western Europeans” (French is the lingua franca in which they communicate), 
as well as “African and Asian types and even races now extinct,” these latter the “descendants of 
the crews, slaves, or sailors brought to these parts ever since the remotest times by seekers of the 
Mountain” (81). 
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